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SECURITY CLEARANCE CONUNDRUM: THE NEED
FOR REFORM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Heidi Gilchrist*
A case can be made ...

that secrecy is for losers. For peo-

ple who don't know how important information really is. The
Soviet Union realized this too late. Openness is now a singular, and singularly American, advantage. We put it in peril
by poking along in the mode of an age now past. It is time to
dismantle government secrecy, this most pervasive of Cold
War-era regulations.It is time to begin building the supports
for the era of openness that is already upon us.'
INTRODUCTION

Imagine you arrive at work as a scientist at one of the country's
foremost labs after twenty years of service. You are sipping your
coffee when security arrives and informs you that your security
clearance has been revoked and therefore, you are no longer authorized to work there, or even be in the building. When you ask
why you have lost your security clearance, and thus your job, the
answer is you are a national security risk and it would even be a
threat to national security to tell you why. You try to appeal the
decision, but you are told it is final. You think to yourself, I am an
American, I have certain indelible rights, so you go to an attorney. You take the agency you work for to court, the court tells you
that it is very sorry but no one has a right to a security clearance
because matters of national security are committed to the Executive Branch, and the court cannot examine the merits of a securi*
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ty clearance decision. Your scientific research and expertise involve national security and there are no jobs that you are qualified for that would not require a clearance. You think to yourself,
now what? This is not fiction, this is the current law of national
security clearances.
One need only to look at recent headlines to understand the
importance of security clearance decisions and the severe flaws in
the system. The New York Times headlined in July 2016: "Email
Case May Complicate Clinton Aides' Pursuit of Security Clearance."2 In order to obtain top diplomatic or national security
posts, some of Clinton's aides will need a security clearance. 3 For
millions of Americans, a security clearance leads to better pay
and job opportunities. In facing the terror threat, we need people
with language abilities and experience abroad. These people are
often unable to get cleared, or if they are, it can take years. At the
same time, we are faced with an 'insider threat' where those with
clearances are causing harm and even deaths. The system needs
to be reformed. However, as important as security clearances are,
most people, even those with a security clearance, do not fully
understand the security clearance process or the fact that if their
clearance is revoked, how little recourse they actually have.
Part I examines the case law of security clearances since the
1988 Supreme Court decision in Department of Navy v. Egan that
has been interpreted broadly to mean that courts do not have the
authority to examine the merits of a security clearance decision.
Drawing on examples since 9/11, this article details two cases involving Muslim men who had worked for the United States government for decades when they had their security clearances revoked.4 It discusses how they were not fully informed of why their
security clearance was revoked, and shows how courts were completely deferential to the agencies' decisions to revoke the clearances.' It then elaborates on areas in the periphery of security
clearance decisions where courts have held that they have the
ability to review the decisions. Part II discusses the special situa-

2. Eric Lichtblau & Steven Lee Meyers, Email Case May Complicate Clinton Aides'
Pursuit of Security Clearance, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com2016/07
/07/us/state-department-emails-fbi.html.
3. See id.
4. See El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 591 F.3d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 2010); Makky v.
Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2008).
5. El-Ganayni, 591 F.3d at 181-82; Makky, 541 F.3d at 212-13.
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tion of whistleblowers in the intelligence community. If individuals in the intelligence community blow the whistle and then their
security clearance is revoked, they lose their job. However, courts,
under Egan, still cannot review the merits of the revocation of
their clearance. Therefore, these individuals are left completely
without recourse. Part III shows reform is needed because there
are serious problems in the security clearance process. Those with
critical skills are not getting cleared or take years to get cleared,
and persons who should never have a clearance have obtained
them, creating an insider threat situation. This article then discusses reforms that are currently being made and that further reforms are still needed. The article concludes by arguing that security clearances are not like wartime battlefield decisions, but
are generally discrimination and retaliation claims that Article
III judges are wholly competent to make, and should make, to ensure the integrity of the security clearance process and the safety
of the country.
I. SECURITY CLEARANCE DECISIONS

A. No Avenue for Redress
If an individual's security clearance is denied or revoked, there
is no avenue for the individual to contest the denial or revocation
on the merits. Although courts have said there is the possibility of
review if an agency has not followed its own procedures,6 and
even the Supreme Court has indicated there may be the possibility of review when the Constitution has been violated,7 no case
has actually been successful. It is accepted that "no one has a
'right' to a security clearance"8 and "genuine and legitimate doubt
is to be resolved in favor of national security."9 Without review,
this leads to the troubling situation where those making security
clearance decisions operate knowing no one will ever review the
decisions they are making.
The reasoning from the Supreme Court in Department of the
Navy v. Egan,1° echoed by other courts, is that courts lack the ex6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Duane v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 275 F.3d 988, 993 (10th Cir. 2002).
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988).
Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).
Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
484 U.S. 518 (1988).
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pertise to make the judgment required in a security clearance
case and that matters of national security should be left to the
Executive Branch. 1' The Court reasoned that "[t]he attempt to define not only the individual's future actions, but those of outside
and unknown influences renders the 'grant or denial of security
an inexact science at best""' and that a
clearances ...
of this kind must be made by those with
judgment
"[p]redictive
the necessary expertise in protecting classified information.""
The Court expanded on its reasoning, giving absolute deference to
the agency making the decision:
[T]he protection of classified information must be committed to the
broad discretion of the agency responsible, and this must include
broad discretion to determine who may have access to it. Certainly,
it is not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to review
the substance of such a judgment and to decide whether the agency
should have been able to make the necessary affirmative prediction
an
with confidence. Nor can such a body determine what constitutes
risk. 14
acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential

The Court concluded that the authority given to the agency in deciding security clearance cases is final: '[A]n agency head who
must bear the responsibility for the protection of classified information committed to his custody should have the final say in deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access
information.... ' As noted above, this must be a judgment
to such
15
call."

11. Thomas Egan was denied a security clearance and therefore lost his job at a naval
facility. Id. at 520. According to the letter of intent to deny a security clearance he received
from the Director of the Naval Civilian Personnel Command, the reason was because of
criminal convictions for assault, being a felon in possession of a gun, and for his failure to
disclose two earlier convictions on his application for federal employment. Id. at 521. Also
mentioned were his past alcohol problems. Id. Egan sought review because he said he had
paid his debt to society for his convictions, that he did not list convictions older than seven
years because he interpreted the employment form as not requiring that information, and
that alcohol had not been a problem for him for three years. Id. He also submitted favorable material from supervisors as to his background and character. Id. The Director of the
Naval Civilian Personnel Command reviewed his submission and determined that it did
not "sufficiently explain, mitigate, or refute the reasons on which the proposed denial was
based. Accordingly, respondent's security clearance was denied." Id. at 522. This is even
after the Court stated at the outset of its opinion, "[t]he narrow question presented by this
case is whether the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) has authority by statute to
review the substance of an underlying decision to deny or revoke a security clearance in
the course of reviewing an adverse action." Id. at 520.
12. Id. at 529 (quoting Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
13. Id. at 529.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956)).
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The Court also discussed how matters of foreign affairs more
generally should be left to the Executive Branch. "The Court also
has recognized 'the generally accepted view that foreign policy
was the province and responsibility of the Executive.' ' 16 "As to
these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown
the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities."" The Court
then concluded, "[t]hus, unless Congress specifically has provided
otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs."'" Therefore, under Egan, security clearance decisions
are often dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
security clearance decisions are committed to the "sole discretion
of the executive branch."'9
Louis Fisher has argued that although Egan is cited for the
broad proposition that the "President has broad and exclusive
powers under Article II of the Constitution to control access to
national security information, especially classified documents," in
reality, "[n]othing in Egan recognizes a plenary or exclusive power on the part of the President over classified information., 20 He
also highlights the majority ruling-"unless Congress specifically
has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant
to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"-to advocate that "[m]embers of Congress
have both the authority and the duty to exercise their own powers
under Article I.,,21 However, Congress has not acted in this area
and judges remain extremely deferential to Executive decisions in
this area.
After Egan, courts have consistently held that they cannot review a case that would have them review the merits of the underlying security clearance decision. Plaintiffs have brought cases
under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Privacy Act, Fifth
Amendment rights to Due Process and Equal Protection, and Title VII to no avail.2 2 To avoid Egan, plaintiffs have argued that
16. Id. (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)).
17. Id. at 529-30 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
18. Id. at 530.
19. See, e.g., Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120617, at
*8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010).
20. Louis Fisher, Judicial Interpretationsof Egan, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS No.
2010-003499, at 1, 27 (2009).
21. Id. at 10 (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 530).
22. See, e.g., Peter B. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 620 F. Supp. 2d 58, 64 (D.D.C.
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they are not disputing the merits of the security clearance decision but allege discrimination that led up to it.23 However, in the
words of the D.C. District Court, "[tlhe D.C. Circuit has long applied Egan's preclusion principle not only to bar lawsuits that
seek to challenge security clearance determinations directly ...
but also to prevent the progression of employment discrimination
and retaliation actions that are, at bottom, based on an alleged
improper denial or revocation of security clearance. '24 Some
courts clearly state they cannot review the case at all.25 However,
other courts state they can review some parts of the case, but ultimately conclude they cannot review the case because it would
engage the court in second-guessing the Executive Branch.26 Other courts have held that a court may only review, "whether a security clearance was denied, whether the security clearance was a
requirement of the appellant's position, and whether the procedures set forth in [the applicable statute] were followed...
which essentially leads to the conclusion that they cannot review
a security clearance decision.
Courts have even found that those with a revoked security
clearance do not have access to the case against them if that information itself is classified:
[b]ecause Mr. Gargiulo had no due process rights with respect to the
procedures used to determine whether to suspend or revoke his security clearance, he had no constitutional right to receive the documentary evidence underlying the security clearance suspension before
his indefinite suspension from employment took effect. He had due
process rights with respect to his indefinite suspension, but they did
not include the right to contest the merits of the decision to suspend
his security clearance.28

2009).
23. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).
24. Horsey v. U.S. Dep't of State, 2006 F. Supp. 3d 256, 268 (D.D.C. 2016) (citations
omitted).
25.

See, e.g., Peter B., 620 F. Supp. 2d at 78.

26. See, e.g., Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 932 (3d Cir. 1996).
27. Romero v. Dep't of Def., 527 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Hesse v.
Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
28. E.g., Gargiulo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 727 F.3d 1181, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see
Peter Finn, U.S. Strips Intelligence Analyst of Security Clearance and Job but Won't Say
Why, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2010, 10:51 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/

content/article2010/11/26/AR2010112605017.html (discussing the Pentagon's justification
of its decision by relying on a national security clause that states "it would harm the interests of the United States to inform him of the accusations against him").
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Therefore, an individual may have their security clearance revoked, and then be told they do not have access to the information
because they no longer have a valid security clearance.
Makky v. Chertoff illustrates the nonsensical position courts
are placed in when they review a security clearance revocation
without being able to review the merits.29 The court says it can
review "[a plaintiffs] claim of discrimination because a discrimination claim under a mixed-motive theory does not necessarily
require consideration of the merits of a security clearance decision ." However, the court then "reiterate[s] that in analyzing
Makky's mixed-motive Title VII claim, we cannot question the
motivation behind the decision to deny Makky's security clearance."31 It seems impossible to consider the mixed-motive, without
questioning the motivation. The court then says Makky was not
minimally qualified for his position without a clearance.3 2 "A security clearance is the minimum requirement needed to hold
Makky's position. Thus, as of January 2005, when Makky's clearance was suspended, he was not qualified on the most basic level
to perform his job. 33 However, that was what Makky was contesting. The reasoning is circular, leaving those revoking the clearance the final say without any review.
Makky also sued for violations of procedural due process,
claiming he was denied adequate notice of the underlying reason
for his suspension. 34 He stated that if he had access to the material,35 he could have contested the Transportation Security Administration's ("TSA") allegations.3 6 But the court found, "[b]ecause
Makky did not have the requisite security clearance at the time
he sought the classified information, TSA could not release that
information to him."37 In situations like Makky, a plaintiff is left
in an untenable situation where their security clearance has been
revoked and the information detailing why their clearance was

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

541 F.3d 205, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
They were released later, well after his suspension. Id. at 218.
Id.
Id.
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revoked is classified. Thus, the plaintiff cannot access the information to contest the revocation decision.
Prior to the lawsuit, Dr. Wagih Makky emigrated to the United
States from Egypt, became a naturalized citizen of the United
States, and was "a prominent researcher and university professor
in the field of aviation security, and is considered to be a technical
expert in that field."38 In fact, after the bombing of a Pan American Airways airplane over Lockerbie, Scotland, the United States
government "asked Makky to create a unit within the Federal
Aviation Administration... for the purpose of developing technology to detect and prevent explosives from being detonated
aboard commercial planes and trains."39
Following general procedures, he submitted his required security clearance renewal application in March 2002.0 On March 19,
2003, the day the United States invaded Iraq, he was placed on
paid administrative leave and told not to come to work. 1 Makky,
on paper, appears to be exactly who the United States government wants working for it. Perhaps there was a real reason behind revoking his security clearance, but would not it have been
worth making absolutely sure prejudice and paranoia after September 11, 2001 didn't play a role?
Another case illustrating the necessity of judicial review is ElGanayni v. U.S. Department of Energy. In El-Ganayni, a nativeborn Egyptian who became an American citizen in 1988 was
hired as a physicist at Bettis Laboratory in 1990." 2 The lab is dedicated to the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, "a joint NavyDOE program responsible for the design, construction, operation,
and maintenance of nuclear-powered warships." 3 He worked
there for seventeen years and "never received a negative performance evaluation and was never accused of misconduct. 4 4 He received a security clearance in 1990, his clearance was reevaluated
five times between 1990 and 2007, and he retained his clearance
throughout that time.4 ' El-Ganayni was Muslim. 4 In 2006, after
38. Id. at 207-08.
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. at 208-09.
41. Id. at 209.
42. E1-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 591 F.3d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 2010).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") raided a mosque in
Pittsburgh during a prayer service, El-Ganayni gave a speech
condemning the raid and criticizing American foreign policy, especially the United States' involvement in Iraq.4" In June or July
2007, El-Ganayni gave a speech at a mosque promoting prison
outreach, but after seeing FBI brochures recruiting Muslim informants, he "told congregants that they should report crimes if
they knew of any, but that they should not serve as informants
for the FBI until it stopped acting like a political organization."4
Finally, El-Ganayni, while serving as an Imam at a prison, distributed a book about Islam titled, The Miracle in the Ant, which
"contained a passage about a defense mechanism found in certain
ants which allows them to burst open their body wall and spray
deadly secretions upon attackers."9
After being interviewed in October 2007 by the Bettis Laboratory Security Manager about whether he supported killing Americans and whether The Miracle in the Ant could be construed to
encourage suicide bombings, he was interviewed by the FBI who
also asked about whether he was a member of Hamas or al-Qaeda
and his views on the Quran. ° In December 2007, he received a
letter saying he was suspended with pay, but then he was placed
on reduced pay.5 ' Then, in January 2008 he received a letter saying:
Reliable information in the possession of the Department of Energy
indicates that you have knowingly established or continued sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, terrorist, traitor, seditionist,
anarchist, or revolutionist, espionage agent, or representative of a
foreign nation whose interests are inimical to the United States, its
territories or possessions, or with any person advocating the use of
force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United 52States
or any state or subdivision thereof by unconstitutional means.

In the letter, there was also an explanation about the procedures
by which El-Ganayni could challenge these allegations." He requested a hearing but, after an initial conference, was informed

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
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that the Department of Energy ("DOE") had terminated the proceedings.54 On May 19, 2008, after revoking El-Ganayni's security
clearance, Acting Deputy Secretary of Energy Kupfer "certified
under Executive Order 12968 that the usual procedures available
in security clearance revocation proceedings could not 'be made
available ... without damaging the interests of national security
by revealing classified information."'5 5 Kupfer stated the decision
was "conclusive," but did not describe the specific national security concerns behind the decision. 6 El-Ganayni's security clearance
was revoked; he was never told the reasons why and even the
procedures generally available in a security clearance revocation
case were not available to him.
Once again, the court in El-Ganayni was placed in the bizarre
situation where it could look at the constitutional claims arising
from the revocation process but only to the "extent that we can do
so without examining the merits of that decision."57 The Third
Circuit reversed the district court for dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction based on Egan and Stehney, but then said it could
not look at the merits of the case because of Egan.5" In Count I,
"El-Ganayni claimed the DOE retaliated against him for constitutionally protected speech by revoking his security clearance.59 In
order to state a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
show, "'that his conduct was constitutionally protected"' and that
'his protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in
the alleged retaliatory action."'65 Although the court admitted that
El-Ganayni "could easily establish that the political and religious
speech that allegedly led to the revocation of his clearance was
constitutionally protected," the court then said it could not look at
the second prong without examining the merits of the DOE's decision, so it failed. 5 Therefore, it would seem more straightfor-

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 183 (citing Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 932 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
although the merits of the revocation decision were non-reviewable, Article III courts have
jurisdiction to hear "constitutional claims arising from the clearance revocation process")).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 184.
60. Id. (quoting Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002)).
61. Id. ("Proving that El-Ganayni's political speech was 'a substantial or motivating
factor' in the decision to revoke his clearance would inevitably require review of the merits
of the DOE's decision. There is simply no way to prove or disprove what was--or perhaps
more importantly for this case, what was not-a 'substantial or motivating factor' in the
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ward to have dismissed it as non-justiciable, because "[w]hatever
else happened, the DOE would always prevail because of Egan. In
short, [the court] believe[d] that Egan present[ed] an 'insuperable
bar to relief."'62 In Count II, El-Ganayni alleged "the DOE and
Kupfer violated his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection by
discriminating against him on the basis of his religion and national origin."" Although stating it had the jurisdiction to hear
the claim, the court dismissed it under the same reasoning as
Count I: "neither El-Ganayni nor a court could compel the DOE to
offer a 'non-discriminatory explanation' for its decision to revoke
El-Ganayni's clearance.... It is beyond judicial review." 4
Finally, the court found that the DOE followed the applicable
regulations and executive orders meaning there was no violation
of the Administrative Procedure Act, even though El-Ganayni
was not given a reason for the revocation of his security clearance
and thus his job. 5 And he did not even have the benefit of the
procedures generally available in a revocation case. The court cited Executive Order 10865, "Safeguarding Classified Information
Within Industry," and discussed how it provided "minimum procedures required in clearance revocation proceedings."66 However,
the court then stated: "[t]he Order also preserves the authority of
the head of an agency to bypass any procedure otherwise provided under the Order, if he determines that such procedures 'cannot
be invoked consistently with the national security"' and such determination is "conclusive."6 7 Similarly, the court discussed Executive Order 12968 and all of its procedural safeguards6 8 but then
said that the agency's head can bypass the procedures in a particular case if it would "damag[e] the national security interests
of the United States., 69 The court completely deferred to the DOE,
decision to revoke El-Ganayni's clearance without demanding some explanation of that
decision from the DOE. It would require discovery of DOE officials and documents concerning the various 'factors' that led to the decision to revoke the clearance, and scrutiny
of those factors to determine which were 'substantial' or 'motivating.' We can discern no
difference between that inquiry and the review of the merits that is forbidden by Egan.")
(citations omitted).
62. Id. at 185.
63. Id. at 180.
64. Id. at 186.
65. Id. at 186-87.
66. Id. at 187 (quoting Exec. Order No. 10865, 3 C.F.R. § 9 (Supp. 1960)); see also 10
C.F.R. § 710.1(b) (2016).
67. El-Ganayni, 591 F.3d at 187.
68. Id. at 188 (citing Exec. Order No. 12968, 3 C.F.R. § 5.2(a)(1)-(7) (1995)).
69. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 12968, 3 C.F.R. § 5.2(d) (1995)).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:953

saying that it properly revoked El-Ganayni's security clearance,
and basically the reasoning is because they said they had to. Once
again, perhaps there was an excellent reason for revoking ElGanayni's security clearance, but it should not be hidden. And it
is a farce to say a court is examining the procedures when the only procedure is that they said what they did was in the interests
of "national security."
After the lawsuit, El-Ganayni, the respected nuclear physicist,
returned to Egypt after residing in the United States for twentyeight years, saying, "I feel very sad that the American people have
lost a good bit of their Constitution. John Adams said that once you
7
lose your rights and liberties, it's very hard to get them back.
Some courts do indeed seem troubled with the extreme deference given to the Executive Branch in this area, but feel powerless to challenge Executive Branch authority in the area of national security after Egan and perhaps 9/11. The district court in
El-Ganayni stated, "[t]he Court recognizes Plaintiffs legitimate
concerns with unbridled executive power and is loath to conclude
that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim that an
American citizen's fundamental constitutional rights had been violated."'" However, it ultimately decided that it did not have jurisdiction." Another court stated, "Indeed, [the plaintiff] raises
legitimate concerns about granting the executive such unilateral
authority;" but it still decided that the "granting, denial, or revocation of a security clearance is a sui generis act over which the
federal courts have no jurisdiction absent congressional directive. 73 Some courts have given some leeway to plaintiffs who
may not even have access to their case, finding, "[w]here a 'plaintiff does not even know the precise contents of his records because ... he has no access to them, a plaintiff cannot be expected
to plead much detail.' 74 But this is not enough protection when
someone's livelihood is taken away.

70. Sally Kalson, Muslim Physicist Leaves U.S. After Losing Security Clearance,PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.post-gazette.com/neighborhoods/2008/11/28/
Muslim-physicist-leaves-U-S-after-losing-security-clearance/stories/200811280 134.
71. El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88243, at *11-12 (W.D.
Penn. Oct. 31, 2008).
72. Id. at*18.
73. Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120617, at *9-10
(E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010).
74. Peter B. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 620 F. Supp. 2d 58, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Doe v. Goss, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2708, at *30 (D.D.C., Jan. 12, 2007)).
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We can say err on the side of caution so that we will all sleep
better at night. But what has been termed 'caution' could also
jeopardize national security. We need diversity in our intelligence
services. We need to think about problems in unique and different
ways-studies have shown that diverse groups make better decisions. Someone who grew up Muslim, or in Bosnia or Thailand,
may be able to think of jihadi terror in a different way. Additionally, people who have travelled abroad or speak foreign languages
can give insight into regions that a textbook could never provide.
United States intelligence agencies need people who can parse
difficult and contrary data and consider multiple perspectives,
not only think one mindset is correct. Language and cultural
knowledge "makes you more sensitive to nuance, which is what
investigations are often all about."76 Further study would need to
be done, but it is also worrisome that many of the recent cases in
which a security clearance was revoked concerned an ethnic or religious minority.
Judicial review would bring about a necessary inner reflection.
Even if courts may mostly agree with security clearance decisions, because there would have to be a high standard of deference given to the Executive Branch, those making clearance decisions will know that their decisions could ultimately go to a trier
of fact and will have to, at least minimally, conform their behavior to fit the existing standards.
All of these cases deal with the revocation of a security clearance. When a person is initially denied a security clearance, he or
she is in an even more difficult situation as it would be nearly
impossible to get past the Egan threshold. Therefore, there is no
way to know how many people there are who could help our country, especially with critical language skills we need, but are unable to get past the clearance process. John Miller, the Deputy
Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism for the New

75. See Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PROc.
NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 18524, 18525 (2014); see also Sheen S. Levine & David Stark, Diversity
Makes You Brighter, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/opin
iondiversity-makes-you-brighter.html ("Diversity improves the way people think. By disrupting conformity, racial and ethnic diversity prompts people to scrutinize facts, think
more deeply and develop their own opinions. Our findings show that such diversity actually benefits everyone, minorities and majority alike.").
76. Dan Eggen, FBI Agents Still Lacking Arabic Skills, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001388.
html (quoting Professor Daniel Byman).
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York Police Department ("NYPD"), stated that fifteen of the nineteen arrests by the FBI that led to charges such as planning to
join Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ("ISIL") came from an
NYPD unit where several dozen multilingual individuals sift
through various websites and social media.77 Why? He said, "[w]e
have an easier time getting Arabic speakers than the FBI, because we don't have to put them through the security clearances
that the [B]ureau does. 78
B. Possible Openings
Some courts have indicated that review may be possible for
constitutional claims. In fact, the Supreme Court, in the same
year that Egan was decided, held "[n]othing in [section] 102(c)
persuades us that Congress meant to preclude consideration of
colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the Director pursuant to that section; we believe that a constitutional
claim based on an individual discharge may be reviewed by the
District Court."79 However, this has been interpreted by some
courts to only apply to the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
because it was decided under section 102(c) of the National Security Act, leading to the odd conclusion that only CIA employees
are entitled to constitutional review."0 Another court "left open
the question of whether we can review a security clearance decision even where an individual presents a colorable claim that the
agency's decision violated his or her constitutional rights."'" And
still other courts find that they can only review constitutional violations in the process of revoking a clearance.8 2 However, no case
77. Steven Brill, 15 Years After 9/11, Is America Any Safer?, THE ATLANTIc (Sept.
2016), http://www.the atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761.
78. Id.
79. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988).
80. See, e.g., El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88243, at
*13-14 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2008) ("However, Webster is distinguishable because it was a
statutory interpretation case, which construed the delegation of power to the Director of
CIA contained in § 102(c) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c). By contrast, the
authority of the executive branch to revoke security clearances is not derived from a statute, but flows directly from the United States Constitution, Art. II, § 2, 'and exists quite
apart from any explicit congressional grant.'... Thus, the fact that Congress did not empower the CIA Director to evade judicial review of constitutional claims when terminating
an employee is not precedential to the issues in this case." (quoting Dep't of Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)).
81. Hegab v. Long, 716 F.3d 790, 795 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted).
82. See, e.g., El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 591 F.3d 176, 183-86 (3d Cir. 2010)
(finding that courts only move jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims arising out of the
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has successfully challenged the revocation or denial of a security
clearance, and only one case has examined the merits of a security clearance decision."
Even when there is a colorable constitutional claim, courts
have found other ways to dismiss the case. Both concurrences in
Hegab v. Long found that colorable constitutional claims were
brought, but found other ways to concur in the dismissal of the
case. 4 Judge Motz's concurrence states: "[i]n light of the holding
in Egan, at most Webster permits judicial review of a security
clearance denial only when that denial results from the application of an allegedly unconstitutional policy. Since Hegab alleges
no unconstitutional policy but only an assertedly unconstitutional
individualized adverse determination, his claim fails.""5 Judge
Davis' concurrence states that Hegab's claims raise a nonjusticiable political question." No matter how it is framed, the individual who is denied a security clearance or has their security
clearance revoked, even when they claim a constitutional violation has occurred, is left in the same situation-without judicial
review of the determination because of the broad deference to the
Executive Branch.
Although other courts have stated that constitutional claims or
claims regarding the process behind the revocation, can go forward, no court has actually examined the merits of a security
clearance decision, except for the Ninth Circuit in High Tech
Gays. 7 The Ninth Circuit ultimately found against the plaintiff

clearance revocation process).
83. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir.
1990) (subjecting security clearance regulations that impinged upon a fundamental right
to strict scrutiny, but ultimately holding that they survived strict scrutiny).
84. See Hegab, 716 F.3d at 799 (Davis, J., concurring) ("Reading the material allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to Hegab, the only thing that changed is
he got married to a dual citizen Muslim activist who, before their marriage, robustly exercised her First Amendment rights of speech and association. I do not regard Hegab's allegations as 'conclusory'; rather, I regard them as 'colorable' within the contemplation of our
precedents. Unlike the allegations in many extant cases raising claims of unconstitutional
security clearance revocations, the gravamen of Hegab's complaint is the alleged denial of
equal protection, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.") (footnote omitted); see id. at 797
(Motz, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 798 (Motz, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 799-800 ("[Wlhether the agency revoked his security clearance on legitimate
national security grounds, or whether the decision 'was based solely on [Hegab's] wife's
religion, Islam[;] her constitutionally protected speech[;] and her [mere] association with,
and employment by, an Islamic faith-based organization."').
87. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565.
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because "[h]is membership in a homosexual organization was
simply one of the many facets of the criteria being considered as
part of [his] homosexual activities. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim
that consideration of these five criteria is unconstitutional must
fail."88
Although some courts state that they can examine constitutional violations in the process of revoking a clearance, others
have found this to be an impossible task as it would ultimately
involve looking at the merits of the case. Many courts cite to
Stehney for the proposition that courts can review the process of
revoking a clearance:
Stehney has not asked for a review of the merits of NSA's revocation
decision. Rather, she asserts NSA violated her constitutional and
regulatory rights in revoking her clearance. Therefore, we cannot
agree with the district court that the political question doctrine precludes review of her claims. Accordingly, to the extent that Stehney
seeks review of whether NSA complied with its own regulations or
violated her constitutional rights, we believe she presents a justiciable claim. 9

However, other courts have indicated that it is impossible to look
at the process without examining the merits and therefore decline
to review. But courts should look at process arguments because
in many contexts, process can be separated from the merits of the
dispute.
Plaintiffs have tried many creative suits to avoid saying they
are disputing the merits of the security clearance decision, without success. However, some cases have allowed plaintiffs to go
forward where the cases have touched on security clearances indirectly. The court in Zeinali focused on the fact that in employment discrimination suits against private employers, "courts can
generally avoid examining the merits of the government's security clearance decision."91
We hold that we have jurisdiction to adjudicate Zeinali's discriminatory termination claim, as he does not dispute the merits of the executive branch's decision to deny his security clearance application.

88.

Id. at 579.

89.

Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 932 (3d Cir. 1996).

90. See, e.g., Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120617, at
*10-11 (E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010) ('To avoid Egan, Ciralsky's counsel at oral argument stat-

ed that the claims arise not from the revocation of his security clearance but from the constitutional violations that led to the revocation. This distinction is illusory.").
91. Zemali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Rather, he disputes the bona fides of Raytheon's professed security
clearance requirement, and he introduces evidence showing
that Raytheon retained similarly situated non-Iranian engineers
who lacked security clearances. We reverse the district
court and
92
hold that Zeinali's discrimination claim may proceed.

At least in the Ninth Circuit, the court did not unnecessarily expand the doctrine to include all cases touching upon security
clearances indirectly.
The D.C. Circuit also decided not to expand the doctrine as
urged by the government to include security referrals.9 3 However,
this is a narrow opening as it only applies to cases where the referral was made using information known to be false.94 In 2001,
Rattigan, an employee of the FBI, pursued a discrimination claim
against his supervisors with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC").9 5 He then alleged that FBI officials retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, when they reported "unfounded security concerns to the
Bureau's Security Division" prompting "an investigation into his
continued eligibility for a security clearance. 9 6 The Security Division did not revoke his clearance, but rather deemed the security
concerns of his superiors to be unfounded.9 7 The court gave a new,
narrow opening for security clearance cases to go forward, holding that "Rattigan's Title VII claim may proceed only if he can
show that agency employees acted with a retaliatory or discriminatory motive in reporting or referring information that they
knew to be false."" The court based its decision on an executive
order, even though there is a conflicting federal statute.99

92.

Id. at 546.

93. Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764, 768, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
94. Id. at 770; see Demetri Blaisdell, Note, Title VII Challenges to Security Clearance
Referrals: Ratigan Points the Way, 4 COLuM. J. RACE & L. 177, 201 (2014).

95. Rattigan, 689 F.3d at 765.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 771; see Burns-Ramirez v. Napolitano, 962 F. Supp. 2d 253, 257-58 (D.D.C.
2013) ("Rattigan I and H are clear that security personnel decisions regarding whether to
investigate, suspend, or revoke a clearance are protected from review, but the actions of

other employees who knowingly and falsely refer a matter for investigation due to discrimination or retaliation are not protected from review.").
99. Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2065-66 (2015)
("In other words, in Rattigan, the court placed an executive order that was issued in the

'zone of twilight,' and pursuant to concurrently shared authority, on equal footing with a
conflicting statute-and then tried to harmonize the two. It did so without inquiry into
whether Congress, in passing Title VII, intended to preclude 'zone of twilight' executive
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Courts are using the narrow opening from Rattigan to allow
cases to go forward that would have been dismissed at the outset
under Egan. Looking at the carve-out from Rattigan, the District
of D.C. allowed a plaintiff to replead his motion "if the alleged basis for the wrongful revocation of [the plaintiffs] security clearance was a knowingly false and discriminatory report or refer1 ' Even though
ral.""
the plaintiff had not mentioned Rattigan, the
court stated, "it appears that a viable claim of [a Rattigan] nature
might be lurking within this case."'01 Whether courts will further
expand this opening will be closely watched.
Courts have also found that they can review cases where individuals were terminated due to unsuitability and there was no
indication that national security was implicated. "[T]he court denies defendant's motion to dismiss and finds that there is subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims regarding his termination from Customs and Border Patrol because there is no evidence
in the record that CBP terminated plaintiff on the basis of a national security determination."'0 2 Similarly, the court in Jones v.
Ashcroft held that it had subject matter jurisdiction to review a
plaintiffs Title VII claim challenging the FBI's rescission of the
plaintiffs employment offer after the FBI determined from a
background investigation that the plaintiff was unsuitable for the
position because the suitability determination was not "made in
the interest of national security."'' The court pointed out that
there was "no evidence before th[e] Court to indicate that the
government, at any time prior to the commencement of th[e] lawsuit, considered national security as a basis for its decision not to
hire the plaintiff."'0 4
In Toy v. Holder, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend Egan beyond security clearances, finding that the denial of access to a
building is different from security clearance cases, but then held
it must defer to the Executive Branch because building access is a
matter of national security.' "[Slecurity-clearance decisions are

orders of this nature. This case thereby illustrates one means through which courts interpret executive orders to deprive Congress-and its statutes--of their due power.").
100. Horsey v. U.S. Dep't of State, 170 F. Supp. 3d 256, 270 (D.D.C. 2016).
101. Id.
102. Corbett v. Napolitano, 897 F. Supp. 2d 96, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
103. Jones v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2004).
104. Id. at 8.
105. Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 884-85 (5th Cir. 2013).
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made by specialized groups of persons, charged with guarding access to secured information, who must make repeated deci1 6 The court
sions.""
then contrasted this with building access:
"[b]uilding access may be revoked, as in this case, by a supervisor,
someone who does not specialize in making security decisions.' ' 7
The court concluded that "[a] lack of oversight, process, and considered decision-making separates this case from Egan, which
therefore does not bar Toy's suit."' However, the court went on
to find that Toy's suit was barred because Executive Order 12968
applied to Toy as a contract employee, and under that order "the
agency has the ability to grant or deny access to facilities within
its discretion based on considerations of national security.""'
Therefore, once again, absolute deferral to the Executive Branch
because of national security is found.
The vast majority of cases dealing in any way with a security
clearance revocation are dismissed at the outset. The government
also argues for expansion of Egan into every area touching on security clearances."0 In fact, in 2013, the Federal Circuit expanded
Egan's broad reach to "noncritical sensitive" positions, adding
hundreds of thousands of federal employees that will not have access to appeal the merits of adverse actions."' In justifying its
broad holding the court stated, "[i]t is naive to suppose that employees without direct access to already classified information
cannot affect national security. The Board and Northover's narrow focus on access to classified information ignores the impact
employees without security clearances, but in sensitive positions,
can have.""' 2 Therefore, employees who do not have access to classified information can have their jobs taken away without judicial
review of that decision. As the dissent pointed out, the very rea106. Id. at 885.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 885-86.
109. Id. at 887.
110. See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("On rehearing,
the government argues that decisions to report security concerns come within Egan's scope
because they 'involve precisely the same type of predictions about risks to national security' as the decision to grant or deny clearance .... ") (quoting Brief for Appellant on Panel
Rehearing at 6, Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 10-5014)).
111. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1159-60 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see Alexandra Cumings, Comment, Kaplan v. Conyers: Preventing the Grocery Store Clerk From Disclosing
National Security Secrets, 119 PA. ST. L. REV. 553, 554, 556 (2014) (arguing that the expansion of Egan to personnel with sensitive positions "disrupts congressional intent, precedent, and the rights of millions of federal employees").
112. Kaplan, 733 F.3d at 1163.
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son Congress gave civil service employees Merit Systems Protection Board"' ("MSPB") review was so they would "be 'protected
against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and... partisan political coercion' that may occur within government agencies."''
They just lost that protection.
Courts should look to Webster and review security clearance
decisions where there are constitutional claims. There is no reason for absolute deference to the Executive Branch in this area,
and courts should review for both violations of the Constitution in
the process of revoking or denying a security clearance, and the
actual merits of the decision.

II. WHISTLEBLOWERS
We need whistleblowers, but if further protections are not put
in place, federal employees working in intelligence with security
clearances will not blow the whistle as they have little or no protection for continued employment after they have done so if the
agency employing them revokes their security clearance.'1 5 Courts
have held that under Egan, they cannot review a security clearance decision even when the employee is alleging that their security clearance has been revoked in retaliation for whistleblowing." ' Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that "whistleblower
protection laws passed by Congress do not alter the constitutional
order, recognized in Egan, that gives the Executive Branch the
responsibility to make national security determinations.""' 7 With113, See About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. http://www.mspb.gov/About/about.
htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) ("The Merit Systems Protection Board is an independent,
quasi-judicial agency in the Executive branch that serves as the guardian of Federal merit
systems .. .The mission of the MSPB is to promote an effective Federal workforce free of
Prohibited Personnel Practices.").
114. Kaplan, 733 F.3d at 1173 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-969, at 19
(1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2741).
115. See RODNEY M. PERRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43765, INTELLIGENCE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS: IN BRIEF 1 (2014) ("Generally speaking, whistleblowers

are those who expose misconduct (e.g., fraud, abuse, or illegal activity) within an organization. In the context of the Intelligence Community (IC), whistleblowers are generally employees or contractors of federal intelligence agencies who bring to light information on
agency wrongdoings. Whistleblowers disclose this information through government channels (e.g., the congressional intelligence committees or agency inspectors general) or to the
media. Such disclosures can aid oversight of, and thereby curb misconduct within, intelligence agencies.").
116. See, e.g., Hesse v. Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1377-80 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1154 (2001).
117. Teufel v. Dep't of the Army, 608 F. App'x 705, 707 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hall v.
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out judicial review, once a security clearance is revoked, the whistleblower is left without a job or any protection."'
The protections for whistleblowers in the intelligence community are extremely limited. The Whistleblower Protection Act offers broad protection to federal employees".9 but specifically excludes members of the intelligence community. 2 ' Therefore,
Congress passed the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 ("ICWPA").' 2' However, the ICWPA only outlines procedures by which whistleblowers can report to Congress
a matter of "urgent concern"'22 and only after first bringing the
complaint or information to the agency head through proper
agency channels.'23 The ICWPA also specifically states that ac24
tions taken pursuant to it are not subject to judicial review.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2007)).
118. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 493-94 (2014) ("Another common
criticism of the current whistleblower protection statutes is that they do not protect covered employees from security clearance-related retaliation .... Allowing agencies to alter
an employee's security clearance provides agencies with a back door way to effectively fire
or blacklist employees who blow the whistle.").
119. The Whistleblower Protection Act includes:
(A) [any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the
employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety,
if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information
is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.
See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(S)(A)-(B) (2012).
120. See id. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I).
121. Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396. The ICWPA was codified in 50 U.S.C. §
3517(d)(5) for the CIA, and for all other intelligence organizations under 5 U.S.C. app. §
8H.
122. "Urgent concern" means any of the following:
(1) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order,
or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.
(II) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress,
on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity.
(III) An action, including a personnel action described in section
2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited
under subsection (e)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
50 U.S.C. § 3517(d)(5)(G)(i) (2012).
123. 50 U.S.C. § 3517(d)(5)(A) (Supp. II 2015).
124. Id. § 3517(d)(5)(F) (Supp. II 2015).
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Therefore, "absent any enforcement mechanism, the ICWPA arguably fails to provide any real protection to national security
whistleblowers."'' President Obama implemented Presidential
Policy Directive 19 ("PPD-19") on October 10, 2012 to protect
whistleblowers with access to classified information."6 However,
it also lacks an enforcement mechanism, and requires employees
to first go to their supervisors.'27 If employees are complaining
about abuses within their own agency, their supervisors will not
give them the protection they need. Therefore, PPD-19 and
ICWPA ultimately will not safeguard members of the intelligence
community who blow the whistle and then have their security
clearance revoked.
The greatest step forward to date in protecting whistleblowers
is Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act, but judicial review is still needed to properly protect whistleblowers. Title VI
prohibits an adverse personnel action as a
reprisal for a lawful disclosure of information ... to the Director of
National Intelligence[,] ... the appropriate inspector general of the
employing agency, a congressional intelligence committee, or a
member [there] . . .of which the employee reasonably believes evidences-(1) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation; or (2)
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a
1 28
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

However, Title VI expressly leaves enforcement to the President. 129 Therefore, for those who have lost a security clearance,
and therefore their job, they will still not be able to contest the
revocation on the merits in court.
There are many examples of whistleblowers who have claimed
they were retaliated against by losing their clearances, but since
there is no external review process, it is impossible to know
whether their allegations are true or not.
When Ilana Greenstein blew the whistle on mismanagement at the
CIA, she tried to follow all the proper procedures. First, she told her

125. Papandrea, supra note 118, at 493.
126. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTivE[PPD-19:
PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS WITH ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 1 (2012), https:/
/fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd- 19.pdf [hereinafter PPD- 19].

127. See id. at 4. The External Review Panel can only make recommendations to the
agency head as to corrective actions that should be taken for the employee who has been
the subject of retaliation.
128. 50 U.S.C. § 3234(b) (Supp. II 2015).

129.

Id. § 3234(c).
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supervisors that she believed the agency had bungled its spying operations in Baghdad. Then, she wrote a letter to the director of the
agency. But the reaction from the intelligence agency she trusted
was to suspend her clearance and order her to turn over her personal
computers. The CIA then tried 13
to get the Justice Department to open
0
a criminal investigation of her.

Greenstein is now employed as Of Counsel at a national security
law firm in Washington, D.C. 3 ' Wouldn't it have been nice to at
least explore her allegations?
The case of whistleblower Franz Gayl shows the importance of
protection for whistleblowers and how review by an outside board
can make a difference. Gayl was a senior science advisor for the
Marine Corps who advocated for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles ("MRAPs") during the Iraq war.132 When his requests were ignored at the Pentagon, he spoke out publicly, going
to Congress and the media. 33 He "described the military's delay in
making a priority of the acquisition of the vehicles as 'criminal
negligence,' given their proven ability to protect troops against
' He was then suspended and lost
improvised explosive devices."134
his security clearance for alleged improper use of a flash drive on
a secure computer.135 "Former defense secretary Robert M. Gates
later cited media reports about the effectiveness of the vehicles,
largely based on Gayl's advocacy, in explaining his decision" to
make procurement a top priority.'36 The MSPB found "there are
reasonable grounds on which to believe that Mr. Gayl's indefinite
suspension is a result of his protected activity and is therefore
prohibited. . . .""' He was reinstated and able to return to work. 3 '
Because he worked for the military, Gayl at least had recourse to
130.

Marisa Taylor, Intelligence, Defense Whistleblowers Remain Mired in Broken Sys-

tem, McCLATcHY (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/nation
allnational-security/article24777871.html.
131. Ilana S. Greenstein, Esq., LAW OFFICE OF MARK S. ZAID, P.C., http://www.mark
zaid.comlbiography.php?id=6 (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
132. Jason Ukman, Whistleblower Franz Gayl Gets His Job Back, WASH. POST (Nov.

17, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.comblogs/checkpoint-washington/post/a-whistlebl
ower-gets-his-security-clearance-backI2011/11/17/gIQAWuJPUNblog.html?utm_terms=.7
46E93666923.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. R. Jeffrey Smith, Pentagon Whistleblower Franz Gayl is Reinstated, CTR. PUB.
INTEGRITY (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/l1/16/7417/pentagon-

whistle blower-franz-gayl-reinstated.
136.

Ukman, supranote 132.

137. Gaylv. Dep't of the Navy, No. CB-1208-12-0001-U-1 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 13, 2011).
138.

Ukman, supranote 132.
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the MSPB, which most in the intelligence community do not. Although advocating for judicial review, any independent review
body would at least offer moderating influence. 9
III. REFORM
A. Recent Failures
Although courts have consistently held that they lack the necessary expertise to decide security clearance cases, the current
system of clearances is under fire for severe inadequacies. Recent
events have called into question the process by which security
clearances are obtained and show that reform is needed. Aaron
Alexis murdered twelve of his colleagues and gained access to the
United States Navy office while having a security clearance.14 °
In his security clearance application, Alexis said he lived in Seattle
but worked in Manhattan. No one asked about that. Alexis told the
investigator that a felony arrest on his record was for letting air out
of someone's tires. He didn't mention that he let the air out with a
.45 caliber Glock handgun. That detail was in a Seattle police report
that also said Alexis had a "blackout fueled by anger." But there's no
record any investigator pursued that police report.

Similarly, there were many red flags raised about Bradley Manning, who disclosed classified documents to WikiLeaks, none of
which were followed up with.14 There was a 911 call from his
stepmother: "[m]y husband's 18-year-old son is out of control and
just threatened me with a knife.' 4 3 He, himself, even wrote that
he joined the military to "sort out the turmoil and mess in my
life."'44 Manning's supervisor went to her supervisor because of
various incidents, including pointing to the patch of the American
139. Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-CrimeRestraints: The Explosion of Targeted,Noncustodial
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 367 (2014) ("A lack of any meaningful independent

review further increases the likelihood of error or abuse. The mere fact, or likelihood, of
independent review serves as a moderating influence, providing a strong incentive for the
decision makers to act in a way they can justify to a court or analogous review board. Independent oversight also serves an important educative function, helping to ensure that
officials learn about and take steps to correct errors. In its absence, ineffective or unnecessary restraints are much more likely to persist.").
140. Scott Pelley, Into Dangerous Hands, CBS NEWS (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.cbsne
ws.com/news/into-dangerous-hands-60-minutes/.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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flag and asking Manning what it meant and he said, "[i]t means
absolutely nothing to me. I hold no allegiance to this country and
the people in it."''
Although he did not have a security clearance, Omar Mateen,
who killed forty-nine people in an Orlando nightclub, one of the
worst mass murders in American history, worked for one of the
world's premier private security companies, G4S.'46 G4S obtained
a $234 million contract from the Department of Homeland Security and had past contracts with the State Department, Justice
Department, Energy Department, Drug Enforcement Administration, Army, and Air Force.'47
Deciding who is a security threat is fraught with difficulties. In
deciding who is trustworthy, are we really deciding who is like
us? If someone is different, do they then appear less trustworthy?
"There are no actuarial models or empirically tested criteria for
identifying who might in fact pose a security threat."'' 8 Do the
contractors doing the background checks have the necessary expertise to understand someone's background who may be different, but be someone who can fill a critical need for the country?
We need people with language abilities who may have traveled
extensively abroad and are risk-takers. These individuals may
not easily pass a security clearance.
Although courts defer to the Executive Branch because of a
perceived expertise, and we therefore cannot know what has happeried in the security clearance area because it is, indeed, classified, an example from the immigration setting is illuminating.
The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIN') denied two aliens
withholding of removal, finding they were a danger to the security of the United States.'4 9 However, in examining the evidence

145. Id.
146. Alan Blinder et al., Omar Mateen: From Early Promise to F.B.I. Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/omar-mateen-early-signsof-promise-then-abuse-and-suspected-terrorist-ties.html?_r=l; Michael Daly et al., Omar
Mateen, Terrorist Who Attacked Orlando Gay Club, Had Been Investigated by FBI, DAILY
BEAST (June 12, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/12/omar-mateen-idd-as-orlando-killer.html.
147. Bridget Johnson, Senator to DHS: How Did Omar Mateen Pass Employment
Check with Federal Contractor?, PJ MEDIA (June 29, 2016), https://pjmedia.com/homela
nd-security20l60629senator-to-dhs-how-did-omar-mateen-pass-employment-check-with
-federal-contractor/.
148. Daskal, supranote 139, at 366.
149. Yusupovv. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 650 F.3d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 2011).
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against them, the Third Circuit found many deficiencies, including the fact that evidence of a terror link from computer materials was, in reality, merely videos from Al Jazeera."' 'Ioreover,
contrary to the BIA's finding, several of the videos, including that
of bin Laden, originated from Al Jazeera, a recognized news
1 1 This is indeed frightening for anyone
source.""
who is even studying Arabic and may use Al Jazeera or other Arabic language
sites as learning material. The Third Circuit summed up their
position:
We are acutely cognizant that, in most respects, Congress has delegated issues of national security with respect to aliens to the agencies that deal with immigration, most particularly to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. We recognize that the BIA is in a position of
knowledge superior to that of the federal courts. Nonetheless, we retain our historic, indeed constitutional authority, to review executive
agencies' determinations, giving their determinations due defer152
ence.

We need a similar deference to the Executive Branch in the security clearance decision process, but there needs to be review so
that people who have watched Al Jazeera are not denied a security clearance because they are honing the language skills we need
so badly.
B. Current Reforms
We need to examine the level of material that is classified, 153
and who really needs a security clearance and at what level.'54 As
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 985.
Id.
Id. at 992.

153.

See generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

206 (1998) ('There may be some basis for short-term classification while plans are being
made, or negotiations are going on, but apart from details of weapons systems, there is
very rarely any real risk to current national security from the publication of facts relating
to transactions in the past, even the fairly recent past. This is the lesson of the Pentagon
Papers experience") (quoting Erwin Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and
Classified Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25). See generally Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POLY REV. 399
(2009) (discussing how to reform the classification system to reduce over-classifying information).
154. See generally Max Fisher, Top Secret Clearance Holders So Numerous They Include Packers/Craters,WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ne
ws/worldviews/wp/2013/06/12/top-secret-clearance-holders-so-numerous-they-include-pack
erscraters/ (discussing the questionable extent to which security clearances have been
granted to employees in the United States Intelligence Community); Brian Fung, 5.1 Million Americans Have Security Clearances.That's More Than the Entire Populationof Nor-
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of 2014, an estimated 4,514,576 Americans held or were approved
to hold a clearance. 55 If there are fewer clearances, we can devote
more resources to making sure those with security clearances are
properly cleared. In the words of Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, "I have long believed that too much material is
classified across the federal government as a general rule... ,,16
Still relevant today is the recommendation of Daniel Patrick
Moynihan's 1997 Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy that, "[t]he best way to ensure that secrecy is respected, and that the most important secrets remain secret, is for
secrecy to be returned to its limited but necessary role. Secrets
can be protected more effectively if secrecy is reduced overall.""' 7
In fact, there is so much secrecy and classifications that scholars
have advocated for leaks as a way of informing the public on unnecessarily classified issues."'
There is not even a uniform definition of Secret/Top Secret or
what jobs need what clearance." 9 Although 95 percent of security
clearances are done by the Office of Personnel Management
("OPM"), the other 5 percent are done by twenty-one different
agencies, mostly within the intelligence community, all with their
own procedures.' 6 ' This leads to a situation where someone could
way, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/20
14/03/24/5-1-million-americans-have-security-clearances-that's-more-than-the-entire-popu
lation-of-norway/ (discussing the ballooning number of Americans with security clearances).
155. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, 2014 REPORT ON SECURITY
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS (2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015-4-21 /20
Annual% 20Report%20ono20Security%20Clearance%2ODeterminations.pdf.
156. Donald H. Rumsfeld, War of the Words, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005, at A12.
157. REP. OF THE COMM'N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S.
DOC. NO. 105-2, at XXI (1st Sess. 1997), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CDOC-105s
doc2/content-detail.html.
158. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 575 (2013) ("The
bloated official secrecy system sends an opposite signal: that the government has something to hide. When the American people learn the executive branch classified more than
ninety-five million items last fiscal year, without learning anything about the content of
those items, the effect is not likely to inspire trust. Concealment on such a scale inspires,
instead, the belief that national security policy is a realm of nonaccountability. Leaks are
holes in the wall that encircles this realm, rays of sunlight from a shadow world ....
").
159. See John V. Berry, The Department of Energy Security Clearance Process,
SECURITY CLEARANCE L. BLOG (July 7, 2015), http://www.securityclearanceblog.com/pa
ge/2/ ("Most federal agencies use similar language when discussing clearance levels. The
most common terminology used to describe clearance levels is Confidential, Secret and Top
Secret. At the DoE this is different. At DoE there are two types of security clearances, the
L and the Q clearances. The L clearance is similar to a Confidential and Secret clearance
and the E clearance is equivalent to a Top Secret (TS)security clearance.").
160. See OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, SUITABILITY AND SECURITY PROCESSES REVIEW 2
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be denied a top secret security clearance by one agency, but still
acquire a top secret clearance from another agency. There is mistrust between agencies as they think their procedures are better,
or they simply do not trust the procedures of another agency.161
There is a plan to develop a new agency, the National Background Investigations Bureau ("NBIB"), within the OPM, to conduct security checks, but it still leaves most of the intelligence
agencies able to separately handle their own security clearanc162
es.
A recent hack of the OPM system highlights these inadequacies.
The hackers' access was so extensive that U.S. officials said they
think it is "highly likely" that every file associated with an OPMmanaged security clearance application since 2000 was exposed [a
total of 22.1 million people]. .

.

. The CIA, largely appears to have

been shielded from damage, especially for 16employees who have never
1
worked at any other agency, officials said.

Some reforms in response to recent events are being made. After strong criticisms following the Snowden case, where his online record would have yielded information about his antigovernment stance, new legislation was passed in December
2015, allowing background investigators to examine applicants'
social media accounts.' Congressman Jason Chaffetz said "we
(2014); Katherine

L. Herbig & Peter R. Nelson, Reciprocity: A Progress Report,

PERSEREC, Tech. Rep. 04-2, at xi (2004).
161. See Herbig & Nelson, supranote 160, at 33.
162. See Exec. Order No. 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to
Classified National Security Information, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,103 (July 2, 2008); Jamal
Brown, Modernizing & Strengthening the Security & Effectiveness of Federal Background
Investigations,WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 22, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2016/01122/modernizing-strengthening-security-effectiveness-federal-background-inve
stigations.
163. Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People,
Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.comne
ws/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-peo
pie-federal-authorities-say.
164. See 5 U.S.C. § 11001 (Supp. II 2012) (instructing the Director of National Intelligence to create policies for checking social media in security checks); see also Andrew Katz,
Potential Blind Spots in Clearance Process that Gave Snowden Top-Secret Access, TIME
(June 15, 2013), http://nation.time.com20l3/06/15/potential-blind-spots-in-clearance-pro
cess-that-gave-snowden-top-secret-access/ ("Just days after Snowden's unveiling, snippets
from more than a decade of his online history were uncovered that could have been cause
for investigators' concern: He was a prolific commenter on government and security issues,

rallied against civil surveillance and contributed to Ron Paul's campaign at least twice
last year. Ironically, the government might be able to prevent leaks like the one that revealed a widespread Internet surveillance program if they do a little more online detective
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give top security clearance ... and we can't go online and look at
their social media ... Go hire a bunch of teenagers. They'd do it
better than we're doing it."' 1 The federal government will now
begin looking at applicants' social media posts as part of the secuon
Faceinformation
process because
rity clearance
book, Twitter, and similar sites is increasingly viewed as an important and relevant part of someone's background.1 66 Also
included is a plan to look continuously at employees, not just at
set intervals. 67'
A candidate's first contact with the agency he or she is going to
work for is the security clearance process. The lack of transparency in the security clearance process and undue delay can cause
grave misgivings in the people who we want to work for the government. In an effort to solve the problem of candidates waiting
years to be cleared, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 required the President to submit an annual report to
Congress on the security clearance process, "to include the total
number of security clearances across government and in-depth
metrics on the timeliness of security clearance determination in
the Intelligence Community."'66 At the CIA, there are seventyeight people who have been waiting over a year for their clear169
ance, and at NSA, 115 people have been waiting for over a year.
Interestingly, the report does not detail how long over a year these candidates have been waiting.17 Every year, the report states,
"The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to face timeliness
challenges in clearing individuals with unique or critical skillssuch as highly desirable language abilities-who often have significant foreign associations that may take additional time to in-

work.").
165. Joe Davidson, Is Obama Administration's New Security Clearance Plan Just
'Happy Talk?, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/power
post/wp/2016/02/25/officials-get-skeptical-questions-on-security-clearance-plan.
166. Damian Paletta, Social Media Posts Now Fair Game in Security Clearance Process, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2016, 3:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-postsnow-fair-game-in-security-clearance-process- 1463 167475.
167. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT
DIRECTIVE 5: COLLECTION, USE, AND RETENTION OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOCIAL MEDIA
INFORMATION IN PERSONNEL SECURITY BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS
1, 3 (1992).
168. OFFICE OF THE Din. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, 2011 REPORT ON SECURITY
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS 2 (2011).
169. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, 2015 REPORT ON SECURITY
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS 11 (2015).
170. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:953

vestigate and adjudicate."'71 We need to prioritize intelligence
agency candidates, with critical skills, or at least not clear the
easy candidates and leave those with critical language abilities
and expertise languishing for years because they are a bit more
complicated.'7 2 Waiting for years for a security clearance may encourage those with the skills the government needs to begin other
careers, and a security clearance denial with no avenue to contest
leaves the country without the critical skills1 3the government
needs, especially in the counterterrorism arena. 1
One of the most unpleasant parts of the security clearance process is the polygraph exam and its efficacy is seriously in doubt.
Courts rarely find polygraphs admissible at trial because "polygraph evidence has long been considered of dubious scientific value and hence has been deemed irrelevant by the federal courts.' 74
However, they are strangely a seemingly critical component of7
the security clearance process within the intelligence agencies. 1
The National Research Council declared the polygraph too inaccurate and called on the federal government to stop using them
as part of the clearance process saying,
tests that are sensitive enough to spot most violators will also mistakenly mark large numbers of innocent test takers as guilty. Tests
that produce few of these types of errors, such as those currently
used by several federal agencies, will not catch most major security
violators-and still will incorrectly flag truthful people as deceptive."'

171. Id. at 13.
172. See Eggen, supranote 76 (Professor Byman states that "[w]ith any new immigrant
communities [sic], they need these language skills, whether it's Vietnamese or Pakistani
or Arabic .... It also often gives you extra cultural knowledge and sensitivity. It makes
you more sensitive to nuance, which is what investigations are often all about ....
It is
easier to get a security clearance if you don't have any interaction with foreigners, which
is not what you want if you want better interaction with foreigners.").
173. See Rowan Scarborough, Lack of Translators Hurts War on Terror, WASH. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/31/lack-of-translatorsstill-hampers-intelligence/ ('"The necessary cadre of U.S. intelligence personnel capable of
reading and speaking targeted regional languages such as Pashto, Dari and Urdu 'remains
essentially nonexistent,' the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote in a rare but
stark warning in its 2010 budget report. The gap has become critical in the war effort, especially in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater, where al Qaeda and Taliban operatives text
message, e-mail and talk in languages that the intelligence community had largely ignored before 2001.").
174. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 73 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Devries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F.2d 939, 945 (1st Cir.1983)).
175.
See Application Process, U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: INTELLIGENCE
CAREERS, https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/icapply.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
176. Press Release, National Academy of Sciences, Polygraph Testing Too Flawed for
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In essence, nervous people may fail the polygraph even though
they have nothing to hide, and people who are pathological liars
who can calmly lie will pass. Or, people can be taught to pass."'
Aldrich Ames passed two polygraph exams at the CIA while spying for Russia, and when asked how he did it, answered, "[w]ell,
17 Once again,
[polygraphs] don't work.""
when someone fails a polygraph and then gets their security clearance denied or revoked,
they have no recourse.
The MSPB has semi-judicial procedures that provide some protection for federal employees, and the Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals publishes its security clearance decisions for contractors online, 1"9 but the security clearance decisions of the intelligence community operate completely internally. Although advocating for judicial review, there should at the very least be a
formal review board for the intelligence agencies, instead of the
current shadowy, internal structure at agencies like the CIA8 0
and NSA.
IV. NOT A BATTLEFIELD DECISION, LEGAL ISSUES
Legal issues such as whether there has been discrimination in
deciding a security clearance are very different from deciding
whether there should be a drone strike or a counterterrorism operation. Courts are "institutionally ill-equipped 'to assess the nature of battlefield decisions.""'" In the words of former Defense
Department General Counsel, Jeh Johnson,
Judges are accustomed to making legal determinations based on a
defined, settled set of facts-a picture that has already been paint-

Security Screening (Oct. 8, 2002), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem
.aspx?RecordID=10420.
177. Martin Kaste, Trial of Polygraph Critic Renews Debate Over Test's Accuracy,
NA'L PuB. RADIO (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/01/02/371925732/trial-of-poly
graph-critic-renews-debate-over-tests-accuracy.
178. Jeff Stein, Lie Detectors Lie (Tell the C.I.A.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1995), http://
www.nytimes.com/1995/02/19/opinion/lie-detectors-lie-tell-the-cia.html.
179. Industrial Security Program, DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS,
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/doha (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
180. See, e.g., Ranger v. Tenet, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2003) ('Mr. Ranger appealed the denial of his security clearance through the administrative process offered by
the CIA. He was denied the opportunity to appear in person before an adjudicative authority; however, he did eventually meet with Mr. Tenet, who was the CIA's Acting Director at
the time. Mr. Tenet promised to 'follow [Mr.] Ranger's appeals process to closure."').
181. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 45 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting DaCosta v.
Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973)).
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ed; not a moving target, which is what we are literally talking about
here. These are not one-time-only judgments and we want military
and national security officials to continually assess and reassess these two questions up until the last minute before an operation. If these types of continual reassessments must be submitted to a member
of the Article III branch of government for evaluation, I believe we
compromise our government's ability to conduct
182 these operations effectively. The costs will outweigh the benefits.

However, courts in security clearance cases are not deciding upon
a moving target-most security clearance cases would involve issues of discrimination or retaliation that judges are completely
qualified to make.
Courts make many complex decisions outside the realm of any
judge's personal expertise every day. Courts often have to make
decisions that involve complex scientific evidence. A trial judge,
acting as gatekeeper, must "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."'83
As Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Joiner,judges will
sometimes have to make "subtle and sophisticated determinations about scientific methodology and its relation to the conclu' However,
sions an expert witness seeks to offer."184
despite the difficulty, judges must make these decisions even though "judges are
not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making of such decisions."'8 5 As Judge Kaplan has
pointed out, "criminal cases arising out of alleged terrorist activity can be tried quite readily in Article III courts. We have been
doing it for over twenty years."'86
As for the fact that classified information may play a role in a
given case, "Article III judges can receive highly sensitive classified information ex parte; in Washington, D.C., the infrastructure
for doing this already exists. ' There are also already mechanisms in place for attorneys to receive clearances if that is
deemed necessary in a case. And the judiciary is "one of the more

182. Jeh Johnson, Keynote Address at the Center on National Security at Fordham
Law School: A "Drone Court": Some Pros and Cons (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.lawfare
blog.comjeh-johnson-speech-drone-court-some-pros-and-cons.
183. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
184. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 148.
186. Lewis A. Kaplan, The Implications of Trying National Security Cases in Article HI
Courts, 8 J. NAT'L SEcuRITY L. & POLY 337, 338 (2016).

187. Johnson, supra note 182.
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leak-resistant of government institutions."' Another possibility,
advocated by a number of scholars is the possibility of centralizing judicial review of terrorist detention hearings in one court,
possibly the D.C. District Court. 9 Therefore, the court would acquire any additional expertise needed in security and intelligence
matters over time. 19
Judicial review is necessary in security clearance decisions.
Just as other scholars have argued that the Supreme Court
should reevaluate its deferential stance in national security cases
more generally,' it is especially true in the security clearance
process where there are easy solutions to any national security
concerns.
Scholars have noticed a similar tension in other areas of national security law. The Second Circuit in MacWade v. Kelly
looked at the constitutionality of the NYPD subway search program where the NYPD set up checkpoints and varied their location, staffing, and timing in an effort to "deter terrorists from carrying concealed explosives onto the subway system and, to a
lesser extent, to uncover any such attempt."'9 2 However, the court
stated that it was not conducting a "searching examination of effectiveness" because the "decision is best left to those with 'a
unique understanding of, and responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.""93 Professor
Rascoff pointed out "the court [in MacWade] rejected the plaintiffs' contention that assessment of constitutionality necessitates
a measurement of the program's deterrent effect. Thus, reviewing

188. Philip D. Reed Lecture Series, Panel Discussion, The State Secrets Privilege and
Access to Justice: What is the ProperBalance?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 9 (2011).
189. Daphne Barak-Erez & Matthew C. Waxman, Secret Evidence and the Due Process
of Terrorist Detentions, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3, 56 (2009).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Aziz Huq, Structural Constitutionalismas Counterterrorism,100 CAL. L.
REV. 887, 945 (2012) ("At the end of the day, it is quite plausible to think the ordinary process of litigation, informed by the government and its adversaries, is more likely to yield a
correct answer to legal questions than the abbreviating punctuation of a structural constitutional presumption."); David Rudenstine, Courts and National Security: The Ordeal of
the State Secrets Privilege, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 37, 96 (2014) ("Perhaps in time individual
justices on the Supreme Court will reconsider the Court's deferential disposition in national security cases, and write opinions that chart a new course-a course in which the
Court functions as a third co-equal and independent branch of government that provides
meaningful judicial review of Executive policies and conduct, even in cases implicating
national security.").
192. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006).
193. Id. at 273 (quoting Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990)).
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courts essentially cede the task of assessing efficacy to the very
officials who design and operate the challenged programs. ' '
Professor Sinnar examined the so-called rule of law tropes
where the Executive Branch publicizes the fact that it is operating under the law, but because there is no review of its decisions
there is no way to actually know whether it is.'9
In seeking to insulate national security conduct from external review, executive officials often publicize self-imposed rules that appear to subject their authority to familiar, well-established legal
standards from constitutional or international law. But executive officials sometimes invoke such standards in public while deviating
from prevalent interpretations of those constraints in secret. The effect is to mislead courts, policymakers, and the public about the extent to which national 96security actions threaten individual rights
1
and democratic values.

The security clearance process is another area where the Executive Branch insists they are operating according to law, but it is
completely internally regulated so it is immune from any type of
substantive review. The CIA's website states, "[t]he clearance
process ....is strictly governed by rules and regulations derived
from Federal statute and executive orders."'97 The process may be
strictly governed, but it is in the dark, with their own internal
policies.
It is fundamental to our society that an individual should have
access to court when wronged, especially something that is so incredibly important that it affects the individual's ability to
work.19 Once denied a security clearance, not only does an individual lose their current position, but it makes it almost impossible to acquire any job that also requires a security clearance.'99
Furthermore, many of the jobs in intelligence require skills that
are not easily transferable to the private sector. After years of be194. Samuel Rascoff, Counterterrorismand the New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 830,
866 (2014).
195. Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566,

1566 (2016).
196.
197.

Id.
Consent Agreement, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ehl/consent

Action.do (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
198. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); Rudenstine, supra
note 191, at 77.
199. See Safeguard Your Security Clearance, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/

veteran-jobs/security-clearance-jobs/protect-your-security-clearance.htm
5, 2017).

(last visited Apr.
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ing a spy, exactly what job are you qualified for? In a system in
which security clearances can be revoked for arguably unjustifiable or misguided reasons, will agencies critical to our nation's security truly be able to attract the best and brightest? Consider
the example of Adam Ciralsky, a CIA staff attorney whose security clearance was revoked and employment was terminated after
two failed polygraph examinations related to his previous employment. °° Whether the CIA based its decision to terminate Ciralsky's employment on his alleged lack of candor or, as Ciralsky
suggested, discrimination, Ciralsky-an apparently talented potential employee of the CIA, instead pursued another, albeit suc201
cessful career path in the private sector.
Once reformed, the security clearance process should be uniform. In an age in which lone wolf and ISIS-inspired terrorists
pose a deadly potential threat to America, local authorities are
playing an even greater role than ever in preventing terrorism.0 2
As a result, authorities such as the FBI, CIA, and local police
must be able to effectively work together. If the security clearance
process becomes uniform, then hopefully at least one part of the
information-sharing problem will be solved.
The Supreme Court has shown in Boumediene v. Bush that it
can give deference to the Executive Branch, without giving absolute deference. The Court starts by acknowledging that the Executive Branch needs to be able to respond quickly to threats that
may arise:
Unlike the President and some designated Members of Congress,
neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our
Nation and its people. The law must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who pose a real danger
•
203
to our security.

The Court then states, "[o]ur opinion does not undermine the Executive's powers as Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed

200. See, e.g., Vernon Loeb, CIA Says 'Lack of Candor'Led to Firing, WASH. POST, Feb.
6, 2010, at A10.
201. See, e.g., 'Nightly News' Wins 2 Emmy Awards, NBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2007, 10:27
AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21577507/ns/nbc-nightly-news withbrian-williams/t/ni
ghtly-news-wins-emmy-awards/#.WJt9U7YrJ-V.
202. See PETER BERGEN, THE UNITED STATES OF JIHAD 57 (2016).
203. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008).
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by the Judicial Branch."" 4 In holding that prisoners in Guantanamo are entitled to the fundamental procedural protection of
habeas corpus, the Court stated, "[t]he laws and Constitution are
designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.
Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are
reconciled within the framework of the law. 2 °5
Fear tactics, such as Scalia's assertion in his Boumediene dissent that the judgment of his colleagues would "cause more Americans to be killed,' 20 6 do not make us safer. Absolute deference to
the executive can actually have the opposite effect.
The definition of a security clearance is whether a person has
access to classified information, up to the authorized clearance
level. Even then, individuals with a security clearance should only have access to information they have the "need to know. 207 Obtaining a security clearance is a prerequisite for employment with
the CIA; however, the CIA considers the "whole person" and recognizes that "no one is perfect":
The Agency recognizes no one is perfect. Agency security officials
consider the nature, extent, seriousness, and recency of past behavior. They weigh the potential risk and benefit of each individual-the
whole person-with utmost care. Although national security is always the paramount consideration, our security experts work hard
to ensure the Agency does not turn away unnecessarily someone who
could
make important contributions to the nation's intelligence ef208
fort.

Although agency discretion in granting security clearances is
necessary to ensure that intelligence agencies get qualified candidates, it is worrisome because there is no judicial review or
oversight of these decisions.
204.

Id.; see Rick Pildes, Does Judicial Review of National-Security Policies Constrain

or Enable the Government?, LAWFARE (Aug. 5, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.lawfare
blog.com/2013/08/does-judicial-review-of-national-security-policies-constrain-or-enable-the
-government ('Those resistant to judicial review, including the government, can too easily
lose sight of this power of courts to legitimate government action.").
205. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
206. Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Security Clearance FAQs, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/mlds/clear
ances/c10977.htm#5 (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) ("A clearance allows a person filling a specific position to have access to classified national security information up to and including
the level of clearance that they hold, so long as the person has a need to know the information."); see Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) (discussing the clas-

sification of national security information).
208. Application Process, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/careers/ap
plication-process (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
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At the very least, cases involving fundamental rights under the
Constitution or Title VII should be subject to judicial review. As
the Fourth Circuit stated in United States v. Marchetti, "[s]ince
First Amendment rights are involved, we think Marchetti would
be entitled to judicial review of any action by the CIA disapproving publication of the material. Some such review would seem essential to the enforcement of the prior restraint imposed upon
Marchetti and other former employees."2 "9 Judicial review of security clearance denial and revocation cases will increase transparency and strengthen the security clearance process.
CONCLUSION

The security clearance process may never be perfect. It is impossible to decide with 100 percent certainty who represents a security threat and who does not. The highly discretionary process
may lead to inconsistencies in situations where one person may
think a cleared individual is a whistleblower, but another person
thinks the cleared individual is a grave security threat who
leaked important classified information. However, the security
clearance process is most individuals' first contact with the agency for whom they are going to work. The current shadowy system,
in which an individual may wait years for a top secret security
clearance with the CIA, is untenable, especially because many individuals who wait the longest or are ultimately denied a clearance are those we need most-candidates who have lived overseas, with critical language abilities, and extensive foreign
contacts.210 The CIA is trying to attract the best and the brightest
candidates, and although some committed individuals will stay
the course, others will either pursue other employment, or will
begin employment with severe misgivings about their employer
and the hiring process. When someone is denied a security clearance, or their clearance is revoked, they are then unable to challenge the denial or revocation on the merits in a court of law.
Some may not even be completely aware of the reason their secu-

209. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
210. See, e.g., CIA Values Language Capabilities Among Employees, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/20
(last updated Apr. 30,
10-featured-story-archive/cia-values-language-capabilities.html
2013).
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rity clearance was denied or revoked. When an individual believes their security clearance has been revoked for retaliation or
discriminatory purposes, they should be able to challenge that decision in court.. These decisions are unlike wartime decisions that
need to be made as events unfold. Article III courts are completely competent to make security clearance review decisions brought
under the Constitution or Title VII.

